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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ANTHONY A. SADDLER,

Case No. 20020119-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Detective McCarthy's affidavit for
a search warrant in this case was deficient as follows: The affidavit contained inadequate
information to support the veracity and the reliability of the informant (the "CI"); the
affidavit lacked sufficient detail; it contained only vague, broad allegations; and
McCarthy's independent investigation was insufficient to support criminal conduct
involving Appellant Anthony Saddler and/or his residence. Under the totality of the
circumstances, the affidavit failed to support probable cause.
In response to Saddler's arguments, the state has raised the following new matters,
which Saddler will address in this Reply Brief: The state claims that with respect to the
CI, Saddler is prevented from disputing "facts presented in the affidavit" because he
"failed to elicit testimony from Detective McCarthy at the hearing on the motion to
suppress" regarding the CI. (Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief), 11 n.3.) Also, the state
claims Saddler failed to consider the affidavit in its entirety as it related to the CI. Those
arguments lack merit, as set forth below. See infra. Point A., herein.

Next, the state asserts the affidavit contains detailed information about the CI's
observations and McCarthy's surveillance to support probable cause. A plain reading of
the affidavit fails to support the state's argument. See infra. Points A. and B., herein. It
must be rejected.
Inasmuch as the state's brief otherwise does not raise any new issues, see Utah R.
App. P. 24(c) (2002) (reply brief shall answer new matter set forth in appellee's opposing
brief), Saddler relies on the arguments presented in his opening brief. As set forth in the
Brief of Appellant, and as further set forth herein, Saddler respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
A. SADDLER DOES NOT DISPUTE THE FACTS IN THE AFFIDAVIT.
RATHER, SADDLER MAINTAINS THAT THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS
INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE.
Saddler maintains that the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant in this
case was deficient. It failed to support probable cause. (Brief of Appellant, Argument.)
Specifically, the affidavit failed to contain relevant information about the CI to support
trustworthiness and/or reliability, and it was silent as to the informant's dealings with
McCarthy. (IdL at Point B.l. and B.2.) Rather, the affidavit discussed the informant's
dealings with drugs and his/her use of marijuana on "several occasions." (See R. 72-74.)
A drug user is not entitled to trustworthiness and reliability. (See Brief of
Appellant, Argument, Point B.l.) Thus, in this case, where the CI was an unknown,
2

unidentified drug user, McCarthy was required to establish the CI's veracity and
reliability with additional facts in the affidavit. (Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point B.)
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, McCarthy failed to do that. (Id.)
Specifically, the affidavit is silent as to how, when or where McCarthy came into
contact with and obtained information from the CI; whether the CI met with the detective
in person or contacted him surreptitiously; whether the CI identified him- herself to the
detective;1 whether the detective had any prior dealings with the CI; whether the
detective investigated the CI's veracity; whether the CI had a history of providing
false/true reports of criminal conduct; whether the CI had a criminal record of his/her
own; whether the CI could be found and held accountable if his/her report in this case
proved to be false; or whether the CI was arrested/prosecuted as a result of the
admissions s/he made concerning his/her own criminal conduct. (See Brief of
Appellant, Argument, Points B.l. and B.2.)

1 The state asserts that because McCarthy sought to protect the identity of the informant,
"[a] reasonable reading of the affidavit indicates that the CI provided Detective McCarthy
with his/her name." (State's Brief, 13.) Such an "inference" is not reasonable on this
affidavit. Where the affidavit fails to disclose how the CI delivered the information to
McCarthy (in person at the police station, over the Internet, by telephone, or by anonymous letter), or whether they met even once, there is no reason to assume that McCarthy
knew anything about the informant, including his/her true and correct name. See
Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey. 744 A.2d 1146, 1155 (N.J. 2000) (reliance on
informant's statements was proper where named informant "waited at the scene and
confirmed her report to police"); State v. Cole, 906 P.2d 925, 940 (Wash. 1995) (finding
that the affidavit contained relevant facts about the informant including that the
affiant/officer knew the identity of the informant).
3

Plainly, information about the encounter between the CI and McCarthy was
known to McCarthy. Yet, he chose not to include it in the affidavit. In the end, the
informant and the encounter here were as mysterious as an anonymous letter. (Brief of
Appellant, Argument, Points B.l and B.2.) Where the CI was not known to be reliable,
his/her reports likewise cannot be deemed to be trustworthy.
In response to Saddler's arguments about the CI, the state makes several
assertions. First, the state claims that Saddler has "dissect[ed]" the affidavit and analyzed
it in a piecemeal fashion. (See State's Brief, 11; also State's Brief, 17 (further claiming
that defendant dissects the affidavit).) The state does not explain that assertion in the
context of this case.
In the event the state's claim is that Saddler has engaged in a marshaling-type
analysis and considered every reasonable inference under the affidavit in connection with
demonstrating the deficiencies regarding the CI, that is true. See.Webster's New World
Dictionary 416 (4th ed. 1999) (defining "dissect" as "to examine or analyze closely").
Saddler has marshaled the facts and inferences in the affidavit to show it lacks
information. Indeed, whether the affidavit in this case is read in a commonsense fashion
under the totality of the circumstances, from right to left, or from bottom to top, it fails to
contain any information about the informant, except to say that s/he knew Saddler for
more than a year, had been to Saddler's home on various unspecified occasions, and was
a drug user. (R. 72-74; Brief of Appellant, Argument, Points B.l. and B.2.)
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The paucity of information regarding the CI fails to support the probable cause
standard. The affidavit lacks objective, particular information to find that the CI was
reliable and his/her information was trustworthy.
Next, the state claims that Saddler may not dispute "facts presented in the
affidavit" concerning the CI, because Saddler "failed to elicit testimony from Detective
McCarthy at the hearing on his motion to suppress" regarding the CI. (State's Brief, 11
n. 3.) That argument lacks merit. Saddler is not disputing facts in the affidavit. Rather,
Saddler maintains that the affidavit in its entirety read in a commonsense manner is
deficient. It fails to support probable cause for the warrant. (See Brief of Appellant.)
Specifically, the issue in this case is whether the affidavit, which was presented to
the magistrate judge, was sufficient to support issuance of the search warrant. See State
v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, Tf9, 40 P.3d 1136 (recognizing that this Court, like the
lower court, is bound by the contents of the affidavit), cert, denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS
150 (April 2, 2002); see also State v. Crain. 725 P.2d 209, 211 (Mont. 1986) ("the
determination of probable cause must be made solelyfromthe information given to the
impartial magistrate and from the four corners of the application"). Thus, "testimony
from Detective McCarthy at the hearing on the motion to suppress" (State's Brief, 11 n.
3) would be irrelevant to that determination.
Stated another way, in lower court proceedings, the prosecutor focused the parties
and judge specifically on the language of the affidavit. The prosecutor informed the
5

judge that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary where the only question before the
court concerned the sufficiency of the affidavit. "[W]hat we are looking at here,
certainly is we're going off the four corner[s] of the affidavit.9' (R. 127:1 (prosecutor's
statements).) "[A]t this point, we're looking at what [] Judge Maughan[, who issued the
warrant, was] faced with when he signed that warrant." (R. 127:7.) In the trial court, the
prosecutor properly limited the matter to the affidavit, since that was the information
available to the magistrate who issued the search warrant. See Deluna, 2001 UT App
401,^9 (Court is bound "by the contents of the affidavit").
As the prosecutor seemed to recognize in lower court proceedings, the validity of
the warrant would stand or fall on the face of the affidavit. Since the magistrate judge did
not consider McCarthy's testimony in connection with issuing the search warrant, such
testimony is not necessary to the analysis on appeal.
Although the state seeks on appeal to point a finger at Saddler for deficiencies in
the matter (State's Brief, 11 n. 3 (claiming Saddler cannot challenge the deficiencies as
they relate to the CI because he did not elicit testimony from McCarthy in the lower
court)), such finger pointing is misplaced. The deficiencies go to the affidavit itself.
Finally, the state claims that with respect to the CI, reliability and veracity are
established in "five ways." The state claims "first" the CI disclosed his/her name to
McCarthy. (State's Brief, 13.) That assertion assumes facts not in evidence. See State
v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (under probable cause standard, this
6

Court will not assume facts not in the record). Further, the assumption is not reasonable.
See supra, note 1, herein.
To explain, as stated above, McCarthy undoubtedly had information as to how,
when and where he obtained information from the CI. Yet, he specifically did not include
that information in the affidavit, thereby suggesting a clandestine meeting, an anonymous
note, or other secret circumstances. (R. 72-74.)
The undisputed facts support that McCarthy (who was in exclusive possession of
information regarding any alleged encounter with the CI) refused to disclose even basic
information that may or may not support that the CI and McCarthy actually met in person.
See Le,, Parker v. U.S., 601 A.2d 45, 48 (D.C. App. 1991) (finding probable cause where
informant "flagged down a police officer" to provide information, and she "gave her name
and address to the officer"); Crain. 725 P.2d at 211 (informant wished to remain anonymous, but identified self to police and met with them in his own home "so his identity
was known to them"); also State v. Bailev. 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (identifying accepted methods for establishing informant's reliability). Where there is no basis
to assume that McCarthy actually met the CI or had personal information about him/her,
the affidavit fails to support a reasonable inference that McCarthy knew the CI's name.2

2 In its brief, the state claims the CI "approached Detective McCarthy" with the
information and the "CI spoke with Detective McCarthy." (State's Brief, 18 & 19.) The
affidavit is silent as to whether or how McCarthy and the CI made actual contact. Since
McCarthy did not reveal even that much information, it is not reasonable to assume they
7

See Le, State v. UtterbacL 485 N.W.2d 760, 768, 771 (Neb. 1992) (finding that affidavit failed to contain adequate information regarding the informant to support warrant requirement), overruled on other grounds. State v. Johnson. 589 N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1999).
Next, the state claims ("fourth") that the informant made admissions against his/
her own interest and subjected him- herself to the possibility of prosecution for the admissions (State's Brief, 15), and ("third") the CI was neither "paid nor promised anything
for disclosing the information." (State's Brief, 14.) See UtterbacL 485 N.W.2d at 767
(affidavit provided that informant was not paid anything; that did not save the warrant).
Since the affidavit fails to support that McCarthy knew the CI's name (see supra note 1 &
pp. 6-7, herein), the CI was never at risk for prosecution.
That is, although the CI admitted to involvement in drug crimes, there is no
indication that s/he was investigated. Indeed, the circumstances support that the CI was
motivated to remain anonymous for his/her own personal benefit. While the CI was not
paid or promised for his/her information, the CI's anonymity ensured immunity.
Since the circumstances regarding the CI and his/her communications with
McCarthy are covert, the CI was never truly at risk either for the drug dealings s/he
admitted to, or for providing false information in connection with this matter. The state's
factors do not support veracity or reliability. Indeed, the circumstances should have

ever met face-to-face or actually spoke. The state reads too much into the affidavit.
8

caused the magistrate judge to question the source and his/her information.
The state also claims ("second") that the CI's "reliability is bolstered" by his/her
personal observations. (State's Brief, 14.) That assertion is tantamount to saying that
every person who reports a personal observation is trustworthy and reliable. Yet, the
criminal justice system does not assume such a fiction. See State v. Mickle, 765 P.2d
331, 332-33 (Wash. App. 1989) (informant was not deemed to be reliable where she had
unexplained association with crime); Kaysville v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, 235 n.2 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (a person who gains information through involvement in criminal activity
is lower on the reliability scale), cert denied 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).
Courts have recognized that even where an informant reports personal observations, that does not lend credence to the informant or report. See Mickle. 765 P.2d at 332
("a claim of firsthand observation will not be used to overcome a credibility deficiency").
The reason is plain. An informant's reliability must be sufficient to show that s/he is
telling the truth. If trustworthiness is lacking, personal observations are irrelevant. The
lack of credibility goes to the informant as well as to his/her report.
Finally, the state claims ("fifth") the "CI's veracity is further strengthened by his/
her fear of retaliation." (State's Brief, 15.) That is insupportable. The affidavit does not
indicate that the CI feared harm. (See R. 72; Brief of Appellant, 19.) Also, as set forth
above, there is no basis in the affidavit to assume McCarthy even had the CI's name to
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disclose it. (See supra, note 1 & pp. 6-7, herein.) Thus, the claim that the CI feared harm
is hollow.
In the end, the state's individual and isolated points fail to take into consideration
the affidavit in its entirety. Also, the state attempts to fill gaps in the affidavit with
assumptions. Assumptions do not support probable cause. State in the Interest of R.B.C.,
443 A.2d 271, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (recognizing that magistrate may make
reasonable inference from commonsense reading of facts, but may not "reach for external
facts [] to build inference upon inference" in order to create probable cause). The record
here is no more revealing than an anonymous letter.3
If the informant here had penned a note to police disclosing his/her "personal
observations" about drug activity at a particular address, and then explained in the note
that s/he wished to remain anonymous out of fear of retaliation, that would not support
reliability, veracity, or probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 225, 227
(1983). Yet, based on such a note, an officer would be able to prepare an affidavit stating
that the informant had made "personal observations" and he/she "was neither paid nor
promised anything" for the information. (See State's Brief, 14.) Also, the officer may
beseech the court not to require disclosure of the informant's name because the officer

3 At one point in the brief, the state refers to the CFs information as "testimony."
(State's Brief, 23.) Significantly, the CI did not provide a sworn statement or testify
under penalty of perjury. He/she provided information under the cloak of anonymity.
10

feared the informant may be harmed. (See R. 72-73.)
The affidavit in that instance, while truthful, would circumvent the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment and Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, for detailed facts and
circumstances. Id. at 239. It would undermine the purpose a magistrate serves in
assessing whether an affidavit contains sufficient detailed facts to support probable cause.
The magistrate in essence would have to assume reliability and trustworthiness where the
officer failed to disclose any relevant facts to support veracity.
Indeed, in this case, facts that may or may not support the CI's veracity and
reliability were known only to McCarthy, but not revealed. Since McCarthy chose not to
include relevant information in the affidavit, the magistrate should have rejected it. A
magistrate must be given sufficient, detailed facts to make a determination of probable
cause. A lack of information cannot be sufficient. In this case, the affidavit failed to
contain relevant information about the CI, it failed to contain information as to how
McCarthy obtained the reportsfromthe CI, and it failed to contain any information as to
whether McCarthy investigated the CI. As the trial court ruled, in most respects,
including where the CI was concerned, the affidavit was "rather broad and vague." (R.
127:12-13 (trial court's ruling).) It was deficient.
B. IN OTHER RESPECTS THE AFFIDAVIT WAS DEFICIENT.
Saddler maintains that in addition to the deficiencies identified above, the
affidavit failed to contain adequate details, and the detective failed to engage in a
11

sufficient investigation to support probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. (Brief
of Appellant, Argument, Point B.2. & B.3.) The state disagrees. It claims the affidavit
contained details surrounding the CI and his/her report (but.s_eea supra. Point A.),4 and it
contained vast details about McCarthy's independent investigation. (State's Brief, 22-27;
but see. Brief of Appellant, Argument, Points B.2. and B.3.)
With respect to McCarthy's independent investigation, he refused even to describe
basic facts relating to the surveillance. McCarthy stated simply that he "did not observe[]
anyone at the residence" during a late night surveillance, and he later observed "some
short term traffic," which he believed was drug related. (R. 73.) McCarthy did not
describe the short term traffic, and he did not say why he believed it to be "drug related."
(Id.) McCarthy also identified an investigation relating to "Oba Tramel," who was seen

4 The state considers the CFs report to be detailed. Yet, the CI reported generalities
without descriptions, or references to time, specific events, dates or others involved.
According to the affidavit, the CI knew the defendant (R. 72, ^[1); the CI used drugs on
several unspecified occasions (R. 72, %3); the CI observed the defendant use, sell, and
carry marijuana and cocaine on unspecified occasions (R. 72-73,fflf2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9); the
CI observed the defendant in possession of marijuana within the "last week to ten days"
(R. 72, ^4); the CI observed the defendant in possession of scales and packaging material
on unspecified occasions (R. 72, Tfl[5, 6); the CI was aware the defendant purchased the
home, worked at a downtown restaurant and drove a vehicle (R. 73,fflflO,11, 13); and the
CI reported that the defendant was home "usually" late in the evening. (R. 73, ^ 1 3 , 14.)
The CI allegedly had relevant details regarding the matter. Yet, the CI provided
generic statements. There were no particulars to support the credibility of the CI's report.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, the allegations are conclusory. (Brief of
Appellant, Argument, Point B.2.) Conclusory information may not support probable
cause. State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. BabbelL
770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989), cert denied. 502 U.S. 1036 (1992).
12

leaving Saddler's residence. McCarthy did not observe or describe any suspicious
unlawful or furtive conduct on Tramel's part in connection with Saddler's residence. (R.
73-74; Brief of Appellant, 37.)
McCarthy's observations were conclusory. Consideration of the affidavit in a
"commonsense" manner failed to shed light on McCarthy's investigation.
McCarthy apparently expected the magistrate to trust that based on "his nineteen
years['] experience and extensive training as a narcotics officer" (State's Brief, 23) he
knew criminal activity and should not be held to the details. That is insufficient.
"Wherever a question indicates a factual basis for a warrant, a reviewing court must
examine it carefully to determine whether the facts were sufficiently specific to assure
that the magistrate's judgment is more than a rubber stamp of the officer's conclusions."
R.B.C.. 443 A.2d at 274; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304 (ruling that the action of the
magistrate "must not be 'a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others'"); Babbell
770P.2dat990.
In the end, the state piles inference upon inference tofillin the "detailed" facts.
(See State's Brief, 13-19.) The magistrate apparently did the same. The magistrate
would have been required to reach beyond the affidavit tofindthat the CI gave a "detailed]" "description" of Saddler's house as the state claims (State's Brief, 16 & 19;
compare R. 72-74 (identifying "facts" for warrant; the "facts" do not include a
description of the residence)); or tofindthat "the CI revealed his/her name to Detective
13

McCarthy" (State's Brief, 13), "spoke with Detective McCarthy" (State's Brief, 18),
"approached Detective McCarthy" about the facts in this case (State's Brief, 19), and was
ever at risk for admitting his/her involvement in drug crimes, or for providing false
information in connection with this matter. (State's Brief, 13, 15).
Read in a commonsense manner, the affidavit reveals simply that an officer somehow received information from an unknown and unconfirmed source; the source alleged
that s/he knew defendant for more than a year; used drugs and observed defendant use,
carry, and sell marijuana and cocaine on unspecified occasions; observed 3 to 4 pounds
of marijuana at the residence "within the last week to ten days"; and observed scales and
packaging material at defendant's home and "on his person" on unspecified occasions.
The source claimed that Saddler recently purchased his home, kept "hours of operation,"
and was "usually" home late; and the source allegedly disclosed information about
defendant's employment and financial situation, although the basis for such information
was unclear and insupportable. (R. 72-73; see Brief of Appellant, 25 n.4.)
According to the affidavit, McCarthy conducted surveillance at the home and
observed "short term traffic," which he did not describe. Also, McCarthy instructed
officers to stop Tramel for inspection, although he did not describe suspicious or furtive
activity on Tramel's part to suggest criminal conduct as it related to Saddler and/or his
home. (R. 73-74; see Brief of Appellant, 37.)
In this case, the lack of information regarding the informant and the reliability of
14

his/her reports, and the lack of detail concerning the independent investigation cannot
serve to support probable cause. Even where the affidavit alleges observations within
the "last week to ten days" (R. 72), that does not save the warrant. See Mickle. 765
P.2d at 332-33 (although informant reported seeing marijuana at residence within the
past 7 days, the affidavit was inadequate); Utterback, 485 N.W.2d at 767 (although
informant "had been inside said residence within the last five days, and had seen a large
quantity of marijuana, and lesser quantities of hashish, cocaine, LSD, and PCP," affidavit
was insufficient).
If the state may obtain a warrant with an affidavit lacking details known even to
the officer, such a policy would undermine the purposes served by the Fourth
Amendment, ensure sleight-of-hand techniques by law enforcement, and obviate the
need for a magistrate to make an objective determination on a case-by-case basis. The
magistrate in this case issued the warrant based on bare conclusions. That is insufficient.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Saddler respectfully requests that this Court
reverse and remand the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
SUBMITTED this / ^ d a y of

VUv^j^

2002.

ifcW

LINDA M.JONES
SHANNON ROMERO
Counsel for Appellant

15

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand delivered an
original and 7

copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State,

5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and q

copies to the Attorney General's

Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, this
I** day of

2002. / O

\U*M^A*^

DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of
Appeals as indicated above this

day of

, 2002.

16

